Mitigate YXDOMAIN and nodata non-referral answer poisoning.

Add a fix to apply scrubbing of unsolicited NS RRSets (and their
respective address records) for YXDOMAIN and nodata non-referral
answers. This prevents a malicious actor from exploiting a possible
cache poison attack.

Obtained from:	NLnet Labs
Security:	CVE-2025-11411
This commit is contained in:
Gordon Tetlow 2025-11-21 13:24:58 -08:00
parent 821774dfbd
commit 2a3a6a1771
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: E5F7BCCBA3BDDDF8

View file

@ -418,12 +418,13 @@ shorten_rrset(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct rrset_parse* rrset, int count)
* @param qinfo: original query.
* @param region: where to allocate synthesized CNAMEs.
* @param env: module env with config options.
* @param zonename: name of server zone.
* @return 0 on error.
*/
static int
scrub_normalize(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
struct query_info* qinfo, struct regional* region,
struct module_env* env)
struct module_env* env, uint8_t* zonename)
{
uint8_t* sname = qinfo->qname;
size_t snamelen = qinfo->qname_len;
@ -431,7 +432,8 @@ scrub_normalize(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
int cname_length = 0; /* number of CNAMEs, or DNAMEs */
if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN &&
FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_YXDOMAIN)
return 1;
/* For the ANSWER section, remove all "irrelevant" records and add
@ -470,6 +472,11 @@ scrub_normalize(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
&aliaslen, pkt)) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "synthesized CNAME "
"too long");
if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_YXDOMAIN) {
prev = rrset;
rrset = rrset->rrset_all_next;
continue;
}
return 0;
}
cname_length++;
@ -650,6 +657,29 @@ scrub_normalize(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
"RRset:", pkt, msg, prev, &rrset);
continue;
}
/* Also delete promiscuous NS for other RCODEs */
if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR
&& env->cfg->iter_scrub_promiscuous) {
remove_rrset("normalize: removing promiscuous "
"RRset:", pkt, msg, prev, &rrset);
continue;
}
/* Also delete promiscuous NS for NOERROR with nodata
* for authoritative answers, not for delegations.
* NOERROR with an_rrsets!=0 already handled.
* Also NOERROR and soa_in_auth already handled.
* NOERROR with an_rrsets==0, and not a referral.
* referral is (NS not the zonename, noSOA).
*/
if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR
&& msg->an_rrsets == 0
&& !(dname_pkt_compare(pkt, rrset->dname,
zonename) != 0 && !soa_in_auth(msg))
&& env->cfg->iter_scrub_promiscuous) {
remove_rrset("normalize: removing promiscuous "
"RRset:", pkt, msg, prev, &rrset);
continue;
}
if(nsset == NULL) {
nsset = rrset;
} else {
@ -1060,7 +1090,8 @@ scrub_message(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
/* this is not required for basic operation but is a forgery
* resistance (security) feature */
if((FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR ||
FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) &&
FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN ||
FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_YXDOMAIN) &&
msg->qdcount == 0)
return 0;
@ -1074,7 +1105,7 @@ scrub_message(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
}
/* normalize the response, this cleans up the additional. */
if(!scrub_normalize(pkt, msg, qinfo, region, env))
if(!scrub_normalize(pkt, msg, qinfo, region, env, zonename))
return 0;
/* delete all out-of-zone information */
if(!scrub_sanitize(pkt, msg, qinfo, zonename, env, ie, qstate))