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Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below. Some security and bug fixes were previously merged into FreeBSD and have been elided. See the upstream release notes for full details (https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html). --- Future deprecation notice ========================= OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever completing authentication or that crash the server. See the discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information. Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or proxies may need to consider these settings. * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8), and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is planned for the future. * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd". * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error. This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new "-q" flag to silence them altogether. * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0] as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5) directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This defaults to "sshd". bz2101 New features ------------ * sshd(8): sshd(8) will now penalise client addresses that, for various reasons, do not successfully complete authentication. This feature is controlled by a new sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenalties option and is on by default. * ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only when particular authentication methods were in use. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the X11 DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479 --- Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48914
258 lines
7.8 KiB
C
258 lines
7.8 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.53 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "ssh2.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "kex.h"
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#include "sshbuf.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "servconf.h"
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#include "sshkey.h"
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#include "hostfile.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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#include "canohost.h"
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#ifdef GSSAPI
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#include "ssh-gss.h"
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#endif
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#include "monitor_wrap.h"
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#include "pathnames.h"
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#include "ssherr.h"
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#include "match.h"
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/* import */
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extern ServerOptions options;
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extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_hostbased;
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static int
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userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
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{
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Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
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struct sshbuf *b;
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struct sshkey *key = NULL;
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char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost;
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u_char *pkblob, *sig;
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size_t alen, blen, slen;
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int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;
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/* XXX use sshkey_froms() */
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if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
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debug_f("cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu",
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cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
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#ifdef DEBUG_PK
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debug("signature:");
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sshbuf_dump_data(sig, slen, stderr);
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#endif
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pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
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if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
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/* this is perfectly legal */
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logit_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
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pkalg);
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goto done;
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}
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if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
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error_fr(r, "key_from_blob");
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goto done;
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}
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if (key == NULL) {
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error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
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goto done;
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}
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if (key->type != pktype) {
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error_f("type mismatch for decoded key "
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"(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
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goto done;
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}
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if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) {
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logit_f("signature algorithm %s not in "
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"HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms", pkalg);
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goto done;
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}
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if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
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options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
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logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm %s",
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(key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
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"(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
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goto done;
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}
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if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
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options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
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logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
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goto done;
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}
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if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
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debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
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goto done;
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}
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if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
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fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
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/* reconstruct packet */
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if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct packet");
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#ifdef DEBUG_PK
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sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
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#endif
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auth2_record_info(authctxt,
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"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
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/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
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authenticated = 0;
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if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
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chost, key) &&
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mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
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sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
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authenticated = 1;
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auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
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sshbuf_free(b);
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done:
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debug2_f("authenticated %d", authenticated);
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sshkey_free(key);
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free(pkalg);
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free(pkblob);
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free(cuser);
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free(chost);
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free(sig);
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return authenticated;
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}
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/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
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int
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hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
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const char *cuser, char *chost, struct sshkey *key)
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{
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const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
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HostStatus host_status;
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int len;
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char *fp;
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if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
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return 0;
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resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
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ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
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debug2_f("chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
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chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
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if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
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debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
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chost[len - 1] = '\0';
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}
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if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
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if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
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debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused user \"%.100s\" "
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"host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", cuser, chost);
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return 0;
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}
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lookup = chost;
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} else {
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if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
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logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
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"client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
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chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
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if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
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debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused "
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"user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
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cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
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return 0;
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}
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lookup = resolvedname;
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}
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debug2_f("access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
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if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
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sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 1, 0, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
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error("%s", reason);
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auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
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return 0;
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}
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host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
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_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
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options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
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/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
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if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
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host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
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_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
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options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
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_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
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}
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if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
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if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
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if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
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options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
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fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
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verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
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"%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
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sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
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cuser, lookup);
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} else {
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if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
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options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
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fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
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verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
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sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
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}
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free(fp);
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}
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return (host_status == HOST_OK);
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}
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Authmethod method_hostbased = {
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&methodcfg_hostbased,
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userauth_hostbased,
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};
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