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e7a629c851
Reduce the number of md5c.c between the three of these from two to one
by just reaching into the kernel build for both userland builds. The
precedent for this already exists for sha2 in both cases.
_libmd_ symbol privatization bits have been moved to sys/md5.h and
md5.h remains to #include <sys/md5.h> for compatibility.
This stops exporting MD5Pad() in the process because the kernel stopped
exporting it in 502a35d60f. soversion is bumped accordingly.
This also renames the libc version of stack_protector.c; it previously
only worked by coincidence because .PATH ordering worked out such that
we got the right one, but this is not the case anymore. Remove the
landmine.
PR: 280784 (exp-run)
Reviewed by: allanjude, delphij
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D34497
137 lines
4.5 KiB
C
137 lines
4.5 KiB
C
/* $NetBSD: stack_protector.c,v 1.4 2006/11/22 17:23:25 christos Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: stack_protector.c,v 1.10 2006/03/31 05:34:44 deraadt Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2002 Hiroaki Etoh, Federico G. Schwindt, and Miodrag Vallat.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
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* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
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* INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
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* (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
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* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
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* ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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*/
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <link.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <syslog.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "libc_private.h"
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/*
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* We give __guard_setup a defined priority early on so that statically linked
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* applications have a defined priority at which __stack_chk_guard will be
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* getting initialized. This will not matter to most applications, because
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* they're either not usually statically linked or they simply don't do things
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* in constructors that would be adversely affected by their positioning with
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* respect to this initialization.
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*/
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static void __guard_setup(void)
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__attribute__((__constructor__ (200), __used__));
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extern long __stack_chk_guard[8];
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extern int __sysctl(const int *name, u_int namelen, void *oldp,
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size_t *oldlenp, void *newp, size_t newlen);
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long __stack_chk_guard[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
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static void __fail(const char *) __dead2;
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void __stack_chk_fail(void) __dead2;
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void __chk_fail(void) __dead2;
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/*LINTED used*/
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static void
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__guard_setup(void)
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{
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static const int mib[2] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND };
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volatile long tmp_stack_chk_guard[nitems(__stack_chk_guard)];
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size_t idx, len;
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int error;
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if (__stack_chk_guard[0] != 0)
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return;
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/*
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* Avoid using functions which might have stack protection
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* enabled, to update the __stack_chk_guard. First fetch the
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* data into a temporal array, then do manual volatile copy to
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* not allow optimizer to call memcpy() behind us.
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*/
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error = _elf_aux_info(AT_CANARY,
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__DEQUALIFY(void *, tmp_stack_chk_guard),
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sizeof(tmp_stack_chk_guard));
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if (error == 0 && tmp_stack_chk_guard[0] != 0) {
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for (idx = 0; idx < nitems(__stack_chk_guard); idx++) {
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__stack_chk_guard[idx] = tmp_stack_chk_guard[idx];
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tmp_stack_chk_guard[idx] = 0;
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}
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return;
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}
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len = sizeof(__stack_chk_guard);
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if (__sysctl(mib, nitems(mib), __stack_chk_guard, &len, NULL, 0) ==
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-1 || len != sizeof(__stack_chk_guard)) {
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/* If sysctl was unsuccessful, use the "terminator canary". */
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((unsigned char *)(void *)__stack_chk_guard)[0] = 0;
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((unsigned char *)(void *)__stack_chk_guard)[1] = 0;
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((unsigned char *)(void *)__stack_chk_guard)[2] = '\n';
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((unsigned char *)(void *)__stack_chk_guard)[3] = 255;
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}
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}
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/*ARGSUSED*/
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static void
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__fail(const char *msg)
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{
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struct sigaction sa;
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sigset_t mask;
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/* Immediately block all signal handlers from running code */
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(void)sigfillset(&mask);
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(void)sigdelset(&mask, SIGABRT);
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(void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &mask, NULL);
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/* This may fail on a chroot jail... */
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syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s", msg);
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(void)memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
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(void)sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
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sa.sa_flags = 0;
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sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
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(void)sigaction(SIGABRT, &sa, NULL);
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(void)kill(getpid(), SIGABRT);
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_exit(127);
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}
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void
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__stack_chk_fail(void)
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{
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__fail("stack overflow detected; terminated");
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}
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void
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__chk_fail(void)
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{
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__fail("buffer overflow detected; terminated");
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}
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#ifndef PIC
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__weak_reference(__stack_chk_fail, __stack_chk_fail_local);
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#endif
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